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 (SIDA Helpdesk Report) 
 
 
Advice on Portfolio Development in the 
Eastern Partnership region and Russia: 
implications of Ukraine conflicts  
 
Section A 
 
Requested by Sida 
 
Sida requested the Helpdesk to review and analyse the direct and indirect implications of the 
conflict in Ukraine in 2014 for the portfolio of programmes supported by Sida in the Eastern 
Partnership Region (EaP) and in Russia; taking into account the Results Strategies for 
Sweden’s support to these regions and countries.  
 
The context is that Sweden supports a portfolio of programmes in the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) region and in Russia, which is being reviewed and developed in the context of the new 
Results Strategies for Sweden for 2014 – 2020 and 2014 -2018 for these two areas 
respectively. The Ukraine crises, including conflicts in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, have 
potentially serious direct and indirect implications for Sweden’s existing and future portfolios 
under these two Results Strategies. Sida requests the Helpdesk’s analysis and advice as inputs 
into a process of reviewing and prioritising areas of support and programming under the 
under the new Results Strategies.  
  
In this context, the Helpdesk is requested to prepare an examination identifying the 
geopolitical and other consequences and implications of the conflicts in the Ukraine on 
countries, and women and men, of the EaP and Russia.  The identified consequences should 
be gender sensitive. On the basis of this analysis, the Helpdesk is requested to: 
 
 Review and identify areas within the Sida-funded regional portfolio for the EaP and 
Russia for which re-focussing might be relevant.  
 Identify regional, including transboundary, effects and responses which could be 
addressed by Sida 
 Identify complementary areas and/or partners for conflict prevention and post-conflict 
recovery for Sida’s possible consideration. 
 
The advice provided should include all main results areas in the respective Results Strategy 
for Sweden; and should be based on principles of conflict sensitivity /do no harm.  
 
Authors: Owen Greene, Katie Morris, and Maija Paasiaro 
 
Helpdesk overall contact: sida-helpdesk@lists.brad.ac.uk and Prof Owen Greene, Helpdesk 
Co-ordinator (o.j.greene@Bradford.ac.uk; +44 1274 235173)   
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Section B: Advice on Portfolio Development in 
the Eastern Partnership region and Russia: 
implications of Ukraine conflicts  
 
Introduction 
This Section presents the Helpdesk’s analysis, findings and advice on the impacts and 
implications of the Ukraine crises and conflicts of 2014 and the possible implications for 
Sida’s portfolio of supported programmes in the EaP region and Russia, taking into account 
the main results areas of Sweden’s new Results Strategies for the EaP and Russia.  
 
The section is divided into three main sub-sections. The first identifies and examines the 
impact and implications of the Ukraine conflicts for the EaP (inlcuding Ukraine) and for 
Russia.  These include direct impacts and implications, and also indirect implications arising 
from the Ukraine crises’ place as an aspect of the  Russian government’s increasingly 
assertive wider policies and practices in relation to its ‘near abroad’ and the EaP overall.   
 
The second sub-section then examines the implications and issues raised by the Ukrainian 
conflicts for the priorities and implementation of Sweden’s results Strategies for EaP and 
Russia (2014-2020 and 2014-2018 respectively). The third sub-section draws some overall 
conclusions, and then provides more specific suggestions and advice as inputs to Sida’s 
review of its portfolios of supported programmes in EaP and Russia 
 
 
1. Impact of the Ukraine conflict on Eastern Europe and Russia 
 
At the geopolitical level, the Ukraine crisis has exacerbated, highlighted or reframed a 
number of longer-term issues affecting relationships between the EU, Russia and Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) countries. A ‘conflict of values’ and competitive allegiances between 
Russia and the West have been brought to the fore, resulting in increased pressure on EaP 
states and citizens to choose between Russian or Euro-Atlantic integration.  
 
This is intensified by Russia’s preparedness to use coercive military action in its 
neighbourhood. The Ukrainian conflict highlights and confirms Russia’s willingness to , 
change interstate borders by military force, and further erodes adherence to the concept of 
territorial integrity in the post-Soviet space.  
 
Moreover, while maintaining  a certain cohesion, the EU’s collective response to the conflict 
initially faltered, revealing disunity and imbalance in member states’ positions and indicating  
weaknesses in aspects of the EU’s existing security architecture. Although these differences 
were overcome during the autumn and winter of 2014 to produce some significant, if 
cautious, EU agreements to apply sanctions against Russian elites, many (including in the 
Russian and Eastern European governments and elites) still perceive EU co-odination and 
determination to be fragile on this matter.  
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The vulnerability of European energy security has also been highlighted by the Ukrainian 
crisis and debates about possible responses ; emphasising the urgent need for effective 
measures to reduce the EU’s and others’ dependence on Russian-controlled hydrocarbons. 
This, along with the sanctions themselves, has likely effects on economic growth and market 
development in the EU, Russia and EaP countries, as well as more globally.  
 
All this creates additional challenges to the ability and willingness for global collective 
action, at a time when proactive and effective cooperation is needed to deal with key global 
threats including Ebola, the Islamic State, and so on. 2015 is a high-stakes year both in terms 
of the on-going crisis in Ukraine and of wider EU and USA relations with Russia. The 
conflicts and associated tensions will have real but unpredictable implications for the future 
of Russian domestic politics and leadership, and similarly in Ukraine and elsewhere in the 
EaP ; with ramifications for the whole of Europe. 
 
1.1. Consequences of the conflict for the men and women of EaP 
 
The consequences of the geopolitical changes in context for the men and women of the EaP 
region are not homogenous, given differences in economic and political development, 
geopolitical orientation and relations with Russia and the EU. Nevertheless, a number of 
important general implications and trends can be identified. 
 
European course 
 
Changing perceptions and appeal of the EU among EaP populations  
Public opinion in most EaP countries has long been divided over the relative costs and 
benefits of Russian or EU orientation. The EU does not feature heavily in public discourse in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan or Belarus, which are largely oriented towards Russia. In the wake of 
the Ukraine crises, the three countries that have embarked on an Association process with the 
EU (Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine) are witnessing diminished support for the EU 
integration process among some sections of the population, reflecting increased polarisation. 
This is related partly to fears of Russian pressure and intervention,  and partly to the 
perceived weak response of the EU to the conflict.
1
 Media sources, particularly television, are 
playing a large role in driving polarisation of opinions in EaP countries (see below). 
 
Economic security in the space between EU and Russia:  
The Ukraine crisis has obviously had direct negative effects for Russia and Ukraine, but with 
substantial spill-over effects for other EaP countries. This is likely to continue if the crisis is 
not resolved and conflicts in Eastern Ukraine continue. There is the potential for these to 
disrupt energy and food security in the region (see below).  
 
The Russian economy has steadily contracted over the twelve months since the start of the 
recent Ukraine crisis. This was due to a number of factors, but has been greatly exacerbated 
by the major reductions in international oil and gas prices. Some analysts predict an outright 
                                                          
1
  One-third of Moldovans favour an Association Agreement with the EU, while half of Ukrainians do. In Georgia, support 
for European integration grew tremendously after 2008, and for the past 6 years stayed at around 65 percent.  However, 
since the events in Ukraine, support has decreased 8 percentage points, while fear of Russia has increased by 14 
percentage points. Source: Europe Policy Paper 3/2014, ‘Regional Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis, Challenges for the 
Six Eastern Partnership Countries’, Ed. Alina Inayeh, Daniela Shwarzer and Joerg Forbrig. http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1404920650Inayeh_UkraineCrisisRegionalOutlook_Jun14_web.pdf (28/10/2014)  
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recession in Russia later in 2015.
2
 In Ukraine, increased military expenditure and disruptions 
in production and trade due to the ongoing conflict have hit the economy heavily, with 
economists predicting the economy will contract by 7.5% in 2014.
3
 This is in the context of 
severe economic problems in previous years. Russian economic slowdown is likely to have a 
significant impact on Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, due to their high exposure to 
the Russian economy. Their close trade, investment and remittance links with Russia imply 
major vulnerabilities, and trade, investment and remittances are all expected to decline further 
as the Russian economy weakens.
4
 Moreover, Russia’s use of trade as a geopolitical tool may 
affect these economies if Russia decides to apply further trade embargoes on key products 
from these regions, to increase pressure on these countries to choose ties with Russia over ties 
with the EU. 
 
Food security  
Since Ukraine is one of the world’s largest grain exporters, analysts have expressed concern 
about the potential impact of the Ukraine crisis on global food security, including in the EaP 
counties. However, Ukraine’s cereal production and export potential remained high in 2014, 
and are forecasted to remain high in 2015
5
. There have not yet been significant changes in 
food security indicators across the region.
6
  
 
The main challenge is in Eastern Ukraine, where disruptions of supply and production mean 
that food security is a significant problem. Food reserves of these areas are fully depleted, 
and infrastructure is partly destroyed. Furthermore, record prices of wheat products, as well 
as destroyed transportation routes and city markets leads to an increasingly difficult food 
security situation.
7
  
 
Human security 
 
Insecurity against violence and coercion 
There have been relatively high levels of violence, and threats of violence, in Ukraine, other 
EaP countries and Russia over the last 25 years. This is manifest in violent crime and 
coercion in domestic and public settings, as well as intra-and inter-community violence and 
insecurity. Several factors contribute to this situation, including inadequate security and 
justice sector reforms to provide accountable policing and access to justice to ordinary 
citizens and vulnerable communities; corrupt links between organised crime and officials, 
enabling criminal acts and extortion with relative impunity; inadequate action to prevent or 
combat intimidation of the vulnerable or local minority or opposition groups ; and inadequate 
action against sexual and gender-based violence. In this context, sexual and gender-based 
violence remain widespread; and in need of continued attention.  
 
                                                          
2
 Focus Economics, ‘Economic Snapshot for Eastern Europe’, 05/11/2014 http://www.focus-
economics.com/regions/eastern-europe (20/11/2014)  
3
 Ibid 
4
 A number of factors (sanctions and oil price) have been behind the steep fall in the rouble, which is now worth 40% less 
against the US dollar than end of 2014. Regional Economic Prospects in, EBRD Countries of Operations: September 20141, 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/REP/rep-2014.pdf 
5
 http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=UKR  
6
 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘although political turbulence in Ukraine has begun to impact 
global food prices, it has yet to have a substantial impact on the structural aspects of global food security.’ 
(http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/Home/DownloadResource?fileName=EIU%20Global%20Food%20Security%20Index%20
-%202014%20Findings%20%26%20Methodology.pdf) 
7
 http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=UKR 
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Such human insecurity against violence and coercion was both manifest and exacerbated in  
the Ukrainian crises and conflicts of 2014. It has been, and remains, particularly severe in 
Crimea and in actual and potentially contested areas of Eastern Ukraine. There has been wide 
intimidation and violence perpetrated by allies of rebel groups, for example in the context of 
the various contested referenda for seccession; and this is increasingly reciprocated by 
Ukrainian ‘loyalists’. In this context, non-political criminal violence is being perpetrated with 
relative impunity. Other areas of EaP share similar characteristics, often associated with so-
called ‘frozen conflict’ contexts but also more widely across society. Trends vary according 
to local context, and not all are negative. But in Russia increased authoritarianism has been 
associated with wider official tolerance of use of violence, within core Russian areas as well 
as in minority areas such as in the North Caucasus (where extreme violence has been 
widespread for some time). In relation to sexual and gender-based violence, recent trends 
have included increased impunity for those perpatrating violence against LGTB communities.  
 
Strains in existing societal divisions and instability perpetuated by ‘protracted conflicts’: 
Several of the EaP countries have severe existing societal divisions along ethnic, linguistic 
and secessionist lines, which have become strained as public opinion has further polarised 
over the Ukraine conflict and the perceived need to choose between Russian or European 
orientation. Minorities (e.g. in Transnistria, Gagauzia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia) favour a pro-
Russia course, viewing events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as an opportunity to advance 
their own secessionist agendas and gain increased support from Russia. There is potential for 
serious insecurity, particularly if Russia uses its leverage in these regions to manipulate 
societal divides in order to advance its aims.
8
 The reach of Russian media plays an important 
role here (see below). 
 
Threats to external security and fears over internal security:  
The hybrid warfare model
9
 used in Ukraine has raised fears in the EaP region over direct and 
indirect Russian aggression in pursuit of its aims in the region, both among those states which 
are friendly with Moscow and those which are more pro-EU. Events have pushed national 
security to the top of the six governments’ priority lists, each having to reconsider where they 
stand.
10
 The long-term problems with security providers in the EaP region - known to be 
corrupt, ineffective and undemocratic - suggest that men and women in EaP are unlikely to 
be, or feel, safe and protected at a time when security provision requires extra sensitivity (e.g. 
during protests, heightened societal divisions etc). In addition, reported penetration of the 
Ukrainian security services by Russian agents puts extra pressure on police services with 
already low ethical and professional standards.
11
 
 
 
Energy security threatened  
The Ukraine crisis has highlighted once again how dependent the EaP region is on Russian 
energy and how vulnerable this makes the men and women of the region to sudden price rises 
                                                          
8
 Russia can use its leverage to hinder further EU integration as a) Russian citizens in these areas provide Russia with reason 
to ‘protect’ these areas b) Russia’s security and economic patronage ensure ongoing influence in these areas, c) these 
areas can inhibit EaP countries ability to coherently implement reforms focused on EU integration.  
9
 https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russias-hybrid-war-ukraine (11/11/2014) 
10
 While Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus are maneuvering carefully in order to avoid dominance by Moscow, external 
security in the form of NATO membership is high on the agenda of Ukraine and Georgia (and partnership for Moldova). 
11
 Natalia Mirimanova, Peacebuilding in Ukraine: What Role for the EU?, 
http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Civil%20Society%20Dialogue%20Network/Discussion%20Papers/EPLO_C
SDN_Discussion_Paper_Peacebuilding%20in%20Ukraine_What%20role_for_the_EU.pdf 
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and to the possibility of lack of heating and fuel in winter.
12
 While the joint EU-Ukrainian 
negotiations with Russia have averted crisis this winter, the situation has served as an acute 
reminder for EaP states of the need for careful management of relations with Russia in this 
sphere.  
 
During 2014, the Russian government has been framing energy as the basis for new 
‘pragmatic’ relations with Ukraine (see for example, Prime Minister Medvedev statement 
(http://government.ru/en/news/16118/ ). Althoug this might ultimately provide a frameowrk 
for progress on co-operation, for the foreseeable future the Russian government can be 
expected to continue to try to use access to Russian gas supplies as political leverage in 
Ukraine and elsewhere in EaP. The decline in global oil and gas prices since the summer of 
2014 is clearly a significant and potentially constraining factor. In an increasingly buyer’s 
market, energy security vulnerabilities of EU states to Russian pressure have at least 
temporarily reduced. But gas pipeline distribution infrastructure remain major enduring 
features, and enable enduring levers of political pressure.  
 
Prospects for democracy 
Security prioritised over democracy: Commentators note that there is a risk of the ‘West’ 
prioritising stability over democracy and becoming less stringent over its terms of 
engagement with the EaP states.
13
 For example, observers have noted a further decrease in 
the space for independent civil society activism in both Azerbaijan and Belarus since the 
Ukraine crisis. There is a distinct sense in Azerbaijan that events in Ukraine have been used 
as a smokescreen for a crackdown on civil society. 
 
Russian media discrediting ‘Western values’: Russia has mobilised its vast media machine to 
influence public opinion in the EaP region. As noted above, opinion remains polarised.  
however, the Russian governament and its powerful controlled media has sought to discredit 
democratic values by casting them as alien and self-serving (see below), with substantial 
success in Russia and parts of the EaP.
14
  
 
 
1.3 Consequences of the conflict for the men and women of Russia 
 
Authoritarianism strengthened  
Rejection of ‘Western values’: Perceptions and appeal of European values among the Russian 
population have hit an all-time low since the Ukraine conflict. Amongst substantial sections 
of the Russian and EaP populations and elites, the EU is perceived as weak and hypocritical 
(with regard to the protection of minorities, for example). The official Russian narrative of 
the conflict accuses the West of promoting Western values in order to depose uncooperative 
leaders in Russia’s neighbourhood to access to Russia’s vast energy reserves.15 The narrative 
suggests that these values are alien to Russia, which is developing its own ‘neither Eastern 
nor Western’ (authoritarian) model of governance - ‘authoritarian capitalism’. This narrative 
appears to resonate with substantial sections of the Russian population and matches a mood 
                                                          
12
 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-central-east-europe-fear-gas-shortage-due-to-ukraine-russia-price-row-
2000648  
13
 Europe Policy Paper 3/2014, ‘Regional Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis, Challenges for the Six Eastern Partnership 
Countries’, Ed. Alina Inayeh, Daniela Shwarzer and Joerg Forbrig. http://www.gmfus.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1404920650Inayeh_UkraineCrisisRegionalOutlook_Jun14_web.pdf (28/10/2014)  
14
 http://www.stratcomcoe.org/~/media/SCCE/NATO_PETIJUMS_PUBLISKS_29_10.ashx (1/12/2014) 
15
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war (3/11/2014) 
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of growing nationalism and influence of the Orthodox Church. This has its resonance also 
into parts of the EaP region.
16
  
 
Popularity of President Putin has apparently soared within Russia:  
According to opinion poll data, Putin’s domestic popularity has soared since the Ukraine 
crisis (currently at 74%)
17
. Levada Centre polling shows that increasing numbers of Russians 
see Russia as being ‘on the right track’ (59% in November 2014; compared to 40% in 
November 2013)
18
, and generally the population seems to be becoming more satisfied with 
the current state of affairs. In an increasingly authoritarian atmosphere, such data should not 
perhaps be taken entirely at face value. There are certainly many dissenting voices, and 
popular support in Russia for Putin’s assertive policies in the Ukraine and elsewhere may 
well prove fragile in the context of economic recession. But in the short and medium-term, 
generating domestic political support is likely to continue to be an incentive for President 
Putin to continue with political and military assertiveness in Ukraine and elsewhere in the 
EaP and ‘near abroad’.  
 
Crackdown on independent media and activation of state propaganda machine:  
The ‘information war’ between Europe and Russia has played a significant role during the 
Ukraine conflict. The Kremlin’s tactics have included shutting down independent press, 
spreading half-truths and rumours and promoting conspiracy theories.
19
 The majority of the 
population, 90% of which accesses news via state-owned and affiliated channels,
20
 supports 
what the state is doing in Ukraine (to protect Russian minorities) and approves of the 
annexation of Crimea.
 21
  
 
Repression of opposition and civil society space intensified:  
In a continuum of policy since 2012, Putin has intensified the domestic crackdown on civil 
society since the annexation of Crimea. Draconian new legislation in numerous areas, ranging 
from Russia's cultural policies to expanded control over the Internet, poses grave new 
challenges to Russian civil society.
22
 Russian NGOs report that it is very difficult for them to 
reach broad segments of the population, with a dominant political culture of accepting a 
relatively submissive and paternalistic relationship with the state. Political opposition is 
increasginly hard ot mobiilse, in the context of increased of repression against Russians 
seeking the active exercise of their rights as citizens.
23
  
 
Economic decline 
Painful downward spiral for Russian economy: Russia’s support of the separatists in eastern 
Ukraine has increased the countries political isolation from at least OECD countries ;  
burdened the economy with painful sanctions, eroded investor confidence, triggered massive 
capital outflows, weakened the rouble, fanned inflation, and forced the Russian Central Bank 
to hike interest rates to combat inflation and stem the slide of the currency. Each of these 
                                                          
16
 Putin’s claim that Crimea held sacred importance for Russians in his recent State of the Nation speech is an example of 
the type of nationalism-evoking  rhetoric which is used to gain support among the population. 
17
 http://www.levada.ru/03-12-2014/otnoshenie-k-vladimiru-putinu (02/12/2014) 
18
 At the beginning of August, there was a peak in these figures, with 66% of respondents believing Russia is ‘on the right 
track.’ This number has been decreasing by approximately 1% each month. http://www.levada.ru/26-11-2014/noyabrskie-
reitingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya (3/11/2014) 
19
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media (12/11/2014) 
20
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/30/mh17-vast-majority-russians-believe-ukraine-downed-plane-poll 
(3/11/2014) 
21
 http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2014/ukrainskii-krizis-politika-rossii-otvetstvennost-i-peremirie (24/11/2014) 
22
 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/04/30/the-kremlins-internet-annexation/  
23
 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/09/putins_assault_on_civil_society_continues (12/11/2014) 
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factors in isolation bears the potential to curb economic growth. Combined, these factors 
threaten to reinforce decline of the Russian economy into a serious economic recession.
24
  
 
EU and USA sanctions expose Russia’s oil-dependent economy’s vulnerability: Although not 
linked to the conflict or EU sanctions (despite Russian conspiracy claims
25
), the decline in 
global oil prices on Russia’s oil-dependent economy has compounded the economic decline 
by making the government’s finances extremely vulnerable in the medium term (in the short 
term, the Russina state has subsntatial financial reserves). EU and USA sanctions are 
however resulting in the withdrawal of Western oil companies, equipment and technical 
expertise needed for Russia to maintain current oil production and explore new oil fields, 
which could lead to a major decline in oil production and the government potentially using 
the National Wealth Fund (designed for state pensions) to make up the shortfall.
26
 
 
Part 2: Implications and issues raised by the conflict context for 
Sida’s Results Strategy for EaP and Russia 
 
This section examines Sida’s Results Strategies for the EaP region and Russia in light of the 
current conflict context, as set out above. It briefly analyses Sida’s Results Strategy and 
implementation plans (where available to the Helpdesk), identifying areas of the strategy that 
need to be reviewed in light of increased challenges to achieving results arising from the 
Ukraine conflicts and from a conflict prevention perspective. It similarly identifies potential 
trans-boundary/regional peace and conflict issues for Sida to address; and options for conflict 
prevention activities and partnerships. 
 
Sida’s Results Strategy for the EaP region aims to forge closer ties between EaP countries 
and the EU by supporting the economic and democratic transition of these countries. This 
policy is viewed as hostile by the Russian government, which has sought to counter progress 
made in this direction. Disagreement over the orientation of EaP countries is thus a root cause 
of conflict in the region and should be understood as such when developing policy and 
programmes there.  
 
Given that genuine democratic development constitutes a long term factor of stability (see 
below), we assume that there will be no fundamental change in Sweden’s, and Sida’s, 
strategic position and aims in the EaP area. At the same time, understanding perspectives of 
conflicting parties is essential. While it may be difficult to accommodate Russian government 
perspectives given its increasingly strong political opposition to democratic and economic 
development in these countries, regular analysis of perspectives is essential for identifying 
where there may be areas of at least limited common interest, providing scope for some 
cooperation or compromise.  
 
It is particularly impportnat to ensure up-to-date understanding of the patterns of concern and 
opinion across society – including pro-Russian and pro-European positions - within each EaP 
country, including respective grievances and interests. Engaging with these positions may 
offer opportunities for confidence-building and cooperation; while failing to acknowledge 
and respond to concerns or pro-Russian interests risks increasing vulnerabilities to instability. 
                                                          
24
 http://www.focus-economics.com/regions/eastern-europe (24/11/2014) 
25
 Reuters, ‘Saudi oil policy uncertainty unleashes the conspiracy theorists, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/18/opec-idUSL6N0T73VG20141118 (21/11/14) 
26
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fc354a6a-5dcb-11e4-b7a2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3K50nEv7j (24/11/2014) 
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There is a widespread perception in the region that the conflict is ‘above’ the men and women 
in the EaP region and can only be fought out by the governments and ‘power elites’ of Russia 
and ‘the West’. While geopolitical interests are unlikely to shift significantly and will 
continue to have an impact locally, it is important from a conflict prevention perspective to 
raise awareness of local people’s agency and their ability to influence their local 
environment, by identifying pragmatic areas where local people can be involved in building 
trust and responding to the conflict. 
  
2.1: Issues specific to Sida’s EaP results strategy:  
 
Result area one: Enhanced economic integration with the EU and 
development of market economy  
 
Across all EaP countries, the impact of the Ukraine crisis is likely to impact on citizens’ 
living standards, as trade, investment and remittances decrease in the face of a weakened 
Russian economy. There is also a risk of Russia applying further trade embargoes on exports 
from EaP countries as a means of political leverage. Supporting economic growth in EaP 
countries, including through diversifying sources of income, is therefore important to ensure 
the economic security of populations in EaP countries. The Sida Results Strategy prioritises 
supporting economic integration with Europe in all EaP countries as a means of increasing 
economic prosperity, meaning success in this sphere is dependent on maintaining support for 
European integration in an increasingly challenging environment, as well as minimising 
tensions with Russia while doing so.    
  
Deterioration in the economic situation of EaP countries will place greater pressure on Sida 
and its partners to demonstrate the benefits of European integration (both economic and 
values-based). This is particularly the case in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Even having 
chosen the ‘European path’ by ratifying Association Agreements (AA), there is a risk that 
governments will lose momentum for reform when improvements are not felt relaitvely 
quickly, and as the population feels the pains of reform, creating opportunities for fanning 
resentment towards the EU.
27
  
 
This risk is accentuated by zero-sum attitudes in the region, whereby economic integration 
with the EU is presented as an either-or situation, in which Eastern Partnership countries 
must choose between ties with the EU or the Eurasian Union/Customs Union. Given all six 
EaP countries have important economic ties with Russia, arguments for maintaining ties with 
Russia over the EU appear strong in subsntaital areas of EaP countries. If Sida remains 
committed to supporting economic integration with the EU, it will need to focus on 
increasing public support for this, and demonstrating that this does not necessarily imply 
substnaitally reduced econimic relations with Russia. Armenia could be explored as a test 
case for trying to eschew a zero-sum course of geopolitical projects and instead seek to 
demonstrate possible win-win approaches to economic integration for Russia, the EU and 
Armenia. If such an opportunity arises, this could serve as a valuable example for the rest of 
the EaP region. In any case, it is important for European actors to actively try to avoid 
superimpose yet another dividing line on a context such as the South Caucasus, where 
barriers to trade and integration are already numerous.  
 
                                                          
27
 The recent election results in Moldova, where the pro-Europeans won a narrow victory, demonstrate the vulnerability of 
the path to Europe. 
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Sida may therefore want to explore how it can supprt efforts to generate well-informed public 
discussion on benefits vs. costs of increasing access to the European market, as well as 
challenging the increasingly zero-sum rhetoric about trading with both Russia and the EU. 
The EU argues that Eastern Partnership countries entering into AAs/DCFTAs with the EU 
would still be free to trade equally with Russia (although Russia has threatened further 
sanctions and embargos if there are further steps towards integration), so it would be useful to 
facilitate public and academic debate to clarify the legal and practical aspects of this. The 
support Sida is currently providing to the FREE network would be one of several possible 
entry points for this.  
 
Second, in addition to Sida’s longer term focus on supporting adaptation of government and 
business actors to the European market, it may be beneficial to focus on quick wins, which 
demonstrate the benefits of European partnership. For example, this could be through small 
grants programmes, supporting innovation and entrepreneurship. In supporting SMEs or other 
income-generating programmes, it will be important to take a conflict-sensitive approach, to 
ensure that certain regions within countries are not seen as privileged over others.
28
 
Programmes should target different societal groups, including less-educated groups ad 
population areas where there are substantial sympathies for Russia, with fewer links with 
European institutions through other programmes (e.g. educational, cultural) and may be more 
sceptical about European engagement. This could help to generate support for European 
integration, and create a platform for discussion on more values-based issues, especially if 
coupled with work on rule of law and anti-corruption as a means of improving investment 
climate. 
 
There is certainly a case for Sida to support regional programmes focusing on the issues 
above, since the economies of all EaP countries (with the possible exception of Azerbaijan) 
are likely to be affected by the crisis, and will face similar challenges protecting themselves 
from risk related to close ties with the Russian economy. Moreover, economic benefit is a 
strong argument for European integration in all these countries, and there may be scope for 
regional dialogue on advantages and disadvantages of freer trade across the European 
continent. In terms of conflict prevention, business partnerships have proven a good tool for 
increasing trust between conflicting parties in the Caucasus;
29
 accordingly, it may be 
interesting to support regional projects as a confidence-building measure, supporting small 
business owners from EaP countries and Russia to develop their products, and facilitating 
networks for them to trade with one and other. 
 
Result area two: Strengthened democracy, greater respect for human rights 
and a more fully developed state under the rule of law 
 
From a conflict prevention perspective, democratic governance is an important factor in the 
development of peaceful societies in which grievances can be expressed and addressed 
through non-violent means. Under the current circumstances, when violence threatens the 
EaP region and democratic paths are in question, this result area deserves special attention. At 
the same time, the conflict brings into renewed focus a need to analyses to understand why 
                                                          
28
 The onlyenglish language project documentation made available to the Helpdesk with details of economic 
empowerment support is the EBRD women’s economic entrepreneurship programme, which may only have limited 
relevant in this context. However, Sida officials may be aware of other existing programmes that offer entry points on this 
issue.  
29
 See details about the Caucasus Business and Development Network, which engages economic actors from across the 
region in initiatives that promote peace and cooperation. http://caucasusbusiness.net/  
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the West’s ‘democratisation project’ in the post-Soviet space has often failed to root 
democratic reforms over the last 25 years. What lessons need to be learnt and what needs to 
be changed now that the task of promoting democracy will be made even more difficult with 
Russia looking to disrupt reform processes and turn EaP populations and governments away 
from European democratic values and institutions? 
 
Strengthened public administration and judicial systems are certainly a priority for support in 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, where serious commitments have been made to reform. In 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, donors need to ask themselves whether continued support 
for institutional reform which has thus far achieved very little change in the eyes of citizens 
might in fact be discrediting the concept of western support for democratisation.  
 
If the momentum for reform continues in Ukraine and the government receives the external 
support it needs to implement substantial reforms for which there is now mobilised pulbic 
suport, the Ukraine experience could serve as an important example for the whole region. At 
least in the medium term, Ukraine has the potential to show Russia and its EaP neighbours 
that a democratic state with a market economy is the type of governance system that gives 
citizens what they want: freedom from corruption, access to services and economic 
development.
30
  However, rapid progress on reform will remain challenging in Ukraine, thus 
highlighting the need to identify ways of building confidence in the possibility of progress, 
inlcuding demonstration projects. If multilateral donors focus on Ukraine, Sida’s regional 
funds could add value by providing opportunities for state and civil society representatives 
from other EaPs (including civil society representatives from Belarus, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia) to witness and participate directly in the reform process, enabling them to export 
experience and lessons learnt to their own contexts. 
 
Civil society is referred to in Sida’s strategy as a “catalyst for democratic development” in 
EaP countries and civil society is identified as a target of support. Any programme to support 
civil society in the current context should consider the polarisation of opinions about the EU 
and Russia across the EaP region and the widely propagated Russian narrative of Western 
governments supporting and financing civil society activities to overthrow non-friendly 
governments in the region. A conflict-sensitive approach requires that donors ensure their 
support is well distributed to a range of civil society activists with different constituencies 
and agendas - urban/rural, majority/minority groups, pro-Russian and pro-EU - and that 
support provided stimulates vibrant debate and builds social trust within the EaP region. 
Debate is essential, both to foster the kind of citizen participation required for a democratic 
system of governance, and to address polarised societal divisions, emerging since the Ukraine 
crisis. Despite disagreement within society over the causes of problems and paths for 
addressing them, there are likely to points of convergence communities’ most pressing 
concerns and grievances (e.g. corruption, lack of accountability etc.)
31
 If such issues of 
common concern can be identified, there are grounds for more constructive discussions about 
how to address them.  
 
The conflict in Ukraine has also highlighted the need for donors to consider which kind or 
aspects of civil society it is most beneficial to empower in the region. Historical focus on 
support for professional and well-established NGOs remains justified and understandable, but 
                                                          
30
 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57031 (5/11/2014) 
31
 During a recent visit to Ukraine, Saferworld staff met with activists from pro-Ukrainian unity and pro-Federalist groups;  
although neither group was prepared to acknowledge any areas of commonality, it was clear that they shared many 
grievances, particularly related to corruption and lack of state responsiveness to their needs.  
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the relatively exclusive focus on these has come into question in analyses of the most active 
and mobilising sections of society.
32
 The mention of Sida’s ability to provide support 
“outside the customary forms in the strategy” suggests that Sida could be well placed to 
support the kinds of non-conventional actors which have become active recently (citizen 
networks, social media groups, youth groups, student associations, universities, intellectual 
circles, schools, religious organisations that pursue charitable and community goals etc.) 
across the EaP region.  
 
As further measures to build civic activism outside the parameters of the professional NGO-
cracy and revitalise civil society in the EaP region, Sida could consider supporting its NGO 
partners to create independent boards involving the private sector and expand their 
membership, thus building its connections to the world outside the civil society sector. Sida 
could for example support its NGO partners to shift their outlook from one limited to HR 
monitoring to include economic justice, access to services and consumer protection – not 
stepping in to provide services, but demanding better services of the state – and thus 
connecting with the issues identified locally as priorities: inequality, education, access to 
public utilities and poor delivery of public services. Sida may also wish to consider involving 
international grassroots activists, creating more national and international networks to 
stimulate new patterns of social behaviour.
33
  
 
Reform processes in Ukraine are likely to remain challenging even in the context of stronger 
national government support. In this context, strategies for phasing and prioritisation of 
support need to be carefully reviewed and updated. This could usefully include 
reconsideration of support for aspects of Security and Justice Sector reform, such as policing 
services and access to justice.  
 
In addition to strengthening specific aspects of the law enforcement chain already identified 
in Sida’s results strategy,34 the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated and accentuated the need for 
wide-reaching reform of the criminal justice sector within EaP countries. Increasing citizen’s 
perceptions of internal security (particularly as the external security environment 
deteriorates), and ensuring security services are capable of managing increased tensions 
within society are essential, both in terms of conflict-prevention and for guaranteeing 
citizens’ right to peaceful freedom of assembly and speech.  
 
With the exception (to some extent) of Georgia, EaP states have made little progress in 
reforming and transforming their corrupt, ineffective and undemocratic policing and security 
providers;
35
 and common obstacles to democratic security sector reform across the EaP 
region could serve as an entry point for regional support. In particular, reluctance among EaP 
governments to involve civil society in discussions about the security sector and weak civil 
society experience working on what they perceive to be ‘hard security’36 are present in all 
EaP countries. Support to civil society in this area may complement existing efforts, by 
helping to generate political will for security sector reform in the EaP region. Again, a 
regional programme would also allow any progress made in Ukraine, as this area receives 
                                                          
32
 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.p
df (18/11/2014) 
33
 Ibid 
34
 Investigation, prosecution and enforcement of sentences, particularly gender-based violence, hate crimes and human 
trafficking 
35
 http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2014/10/13/enp-after-ukraine/ (28/10/2014) 
36
 http://fride.org/download/PB_154_Levers_for_change.pdf (24/11/2014) 
 14 
 
additional attention through the appointment of an EU Advisory Mission on police reform, to 
be shared across the EaP region, thereby providing impetus for change elsewhere. 
 
The Ukraine conflict has reframed the protracted conflicts of the EaP region as issues of vital 
strategic interest for Europe and should trigger renewed interest and efforts to reach peaceful 
agreements. This urgently requires up-dated reviews of possibiities, based on realistic 
understanding of the current context and constraints as well as of opportunities.  
 
Sida’s regional operationalisation notes suggest that Sida may consider undertaking a 
regional conflict analysis to identify regional entry points. It is recommended that this plan is 
followed through with an emphasis on participatory processes, which in itself would 
contribute to regional peacebuilding aims (by encouraging debate). Such projects are 
regularly undertaken by joint teams of international and local civil society groups and have 
the potential to generate the kinds of ideas and impetus which are currently lacking. In 
addition, Sida may wish to include in its analysis a lessons learning component on work done 
to date on protracted conflicts in the region. 
 
The Results Strategy rightly identifies the need for trust-building between parties in the 
protracted conflicts as a priority for funding in the EaP region. However, this strategy may 
need to be re-evaluated to account for the intensification in Russia’s role in the conflicts and 
apparent interest in sustaining and fuelling them to maintain leverage across the EaPs and 
EU. It should be recognised that Russia sets the terms for all dialogue across divides and 
remains the single most effective force for peace or conflict and, if Russia’s interest is for the 
conflicts to continue, this is what will happen. The West and its institutions lag far behind in 
influence and trust among the conflicting parties and populations, increasingly so since the 
Ukraine conflict. There is therefore a need not only to build confidence between conflicting 
parties, but also in the parties hoping to mediate between the conflicting parties. This is likely 
to include continued support for civil society in these areas, providing tangible benefits for 
communities living there (for example in the educational, cultural or economic spheres).  
 
Russia’s strong media and political influence in the protracted conflicts areas, particularly 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, has impacted attitudes towards the Ukraine crisis 
and towards Western values more broadly, at both a societal level and on the actions of de 
facto governance systems. While there may be resistance in Tbilisi and Chisinau to perceived 
state-building in these areas, measures to ensure tolerant, inclusive governance in the self-
proclaimed republics are much needed, to counter these areas’ increasing departure from the 
European values Sida is promoting in the EaP region. Work in this area would require 
governance interventions promoting transparent, inclusive governance within the self-
declared republics, as well as engagement with government and society in Moldova- and 
Georgia-proper on why good governance in these areas is in their longer-term interests, as it 
prevents a further distancing between them. 
 
Result area three: A better environment, reduced climate impact and 
enhanced resilience to environmental impact and climate change 
 
With the exception of supporting renewable energy (see below), this result area may offer 
opportunities for wider regional cooperation on issues not traditionally perceived as falling 
within the sphere of competition between the EU and Russia. Sida may wish to explore 
whether its regional programmes on environment and climate change are able to reach out to 
Russian stakeholders, as an example area where cooperation between all regional actors - EU, 
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EaP countries and Russia - can be beneficial (and not a zero-sum game). Furthermore, 
programmes supporting civil society engagement on environmental issues may provide an 
opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of civil society-state cooperation and generally 
increase the potential of citizen participation, thus simultaneously promoting democratic 
development and European values. Opportunities here are obviously highly politically 
constrained. In terms of risks associated with the current conflict, Russian propaganda about 
the conflict being about the West’s interest in Russia’s energy reserves (hydrocarbons) may 
create an additional challenge for promoting sustainable energy, green business and climate 
change issues in EaPs. However, a demonstrated commitment to these policies by actors such 
as Sida could also help to counter this propaganda. 
 
2.2: Issues specific to Sida’s Russia Results Strategy:  
 
Result area one: Increased respect for human rights and strengthened 
democratic development and accountability 
 
Despite the likelihood of increased constraints on civil society, and the unlikeliness of 
significant shifts in Russian elite attitudes to democracy promotion while Putin and his 
political allies remain in power, we believe that support for inclusive decision-making and 
fair governance processes should remain a important area of support for Sida – taking 
oportunities when identified. Constituencies remain within Russia that are supportive of 
democracy, which Sida can look to support, obviously taking care to mitigate risks of 
increasing the vulnerability of such groups to marginalisation or repression.  
 
In reviewing its strategy in light of the current context, we assume that Sida recognises that 
additional constraints on civil society and other actors operating in Russia and mistrust 
towards foreign donors create increased risk for Sida and partners, both in terms of pressure 
on those operating there; and greater obstacles to achieving results and adjustments to the 
approach will need to be made accordingly. This section therefore focuses on implications for 
Sida, in terms of rendering democracy attractive to Russians and supporting civil society and 
media partners and initiatives so as to minimise risk. 
 
In order to increase the chances of success of democracy promotion, Sida and its parterns  
need to seek oportunities to demonstrate the value of democracy to Russian society and build 
trust in this concept. Despite the Russian elite’s hostility towards European values (including 
‘European-style democracy’), some support remains for the idea of democracy at the societal 
level. A poll conducted by the Levada Centre in October 2014 found that 62% of Russians 
believe that Russia needs democracy, although only 13% believe that Russia needs a 
democracy based on that seen in Europe and the US (decrease from 26% in 2013), while 55% 
think Russia needs a particular type of democracy that corresponds to the national traditions 
and specifics of Russia (increase from 34% in 2013).
37 
This provides an entry point for debate 
on what democracy promotion actually means, including breaking it down into 
understandable activities and principles, in order to try and build public understanding of how 
democratic changes and support for human rights can bring tangible benefits for Russian 
society. This is likely to include a focus on more pragmatic issues, such as improving the rule 
of law, increasing transparency and countering corruption, and linking this to improvements 
the business climate, which should lead to greater benefits for society. It may even be worth 
                                                          
37
 Levada Centre, Nuzhen li Rossiya demokratiya? (Does Russia need democracy?), http://www.levada.ru/28-10-
2014/nuzhna-li-rossii-demokratiya (28/10/2014) 
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considering adding into the portfolio support for income-generating activities, which could be 
tied to work on anti-corruption measures, as a means of promoting support for this approach 
and demonstrating tangible benefits of rules-based approaches. 
 
Sida’s Russia Results Strategy identifies civil society as essential for ensuring citizen 
involvement in community development. However Sida’s existing and potential civil society 
partners face a number of challenges, accentuated by the Ukraine crisis, related to how they 
are perceived and the constraints this puts on their ability to build relations and influence 
others. To overcome this, a number of issues could be considered:  
 
Supporting the emergence of independent, sustainable NGOs: An increasingly hostile 
environment for Western values, combined with amendments to the NGO law
38
, creates 
additional challenges for CSOs receiving foreign funding: namely, de-legitimisation in the 
eyes of the population, and increased difficulties building partnerships with State actors to 
work on reform. Moreover, at a higher political level, ongoing foreign funding of Russian 
CSOs is likely to exacerbate tensions between Russia and donor countries. Accordingly, there 
is a strong argument for supporting CSOs to generate their own income, creating a civil 
society cadre that is reliant on neither the West nor the Russian government
39
 for financing. 
The Sida strategy refers to improving self-financing of CSOs. This, as well as supporting 
CSOs to identify alternative donors within Russia, needs to remain a priority in terms of 
preserving an independent civil society, perceived as neutral and trusted by the population, 
and supporting more sustainable democracy and human rights promotion in Russia.   
 
Enhancing outreach capacity: As noted above, civil society organisations are likely to meet 
an increasingly hostile environment in promoting their ideas. In order to challenge 
misconceptions about what democracy means within Russia, and build support for alternative 
points of view, civil society will need to enhance its outreach and public communication 
strategies. This is particularly relevant given that alternative voices will be confronting civil 
society opinion formers (both in the media and groups such as Nashi), with access to far 
greater funding and more developed approaches to grassroots mobilisation. Therefore, when 
developing civil society capacity, Sida may need to lay greater emphasis on developing 
outreach and communication skills, in addition to other forms of thematic and institutional 
development. Sida will need to provide additional support to smaller, independent NGOs, and 
support them to develop their outreach capacities, as well as thematic and institutional 
capacities, as identified in the Results Strategy. 
 
Diversifying types of partners: A further method for increasing partners’ impact and reducing 
risk placed on them, is to develop relationships with actors whom it is harder to label as 
foreign agents. This could include more disparate groups of civil society activists, working 
together through virtual networks; academic institutions; and professional bodies. Similarly, 
Sida may wish to consider providing more flexible, core support to movements or groups 
which may not be well established and be able to commit to the usual donor reporting 
commitments. That said, it is essential to maintain transparency about funding in order not to 
provoke more suspicion about ‘foreign agents’. 
 
                                                          
38
 In June 2014, Putin signed an amendment to the NGO law, allowing the Justice Ministry to register NGOs receiving 
foreign funding and ‘engaged in political activity’ as foreign agents, without their involvement - resulting in an increase in 
organisations registered as such. 
39
 While the Russian government has increased funding for Russian CSOs; it is important to preserve the independence of 
CSOs and prevent them becoming an extension of the state, or restricted to delivering social services. 
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The Results Strategy identifies choosing appropriate types of initiative as a form of risk 
management. In the currently hostile environment, the choice of initiative can also play a 
significant role in increasing the chances of having any impact at all. Sida should consider 
which types of initiatives are likely to gain most traction in this context and which are likely 
to attract more suspicion and risk for local partners. For example, one strategy to counter 
resistance to work in this Result Area, might be to ensure that programming includes 
significant government involvement (at either a central or local level) so that it is seen as a 
cooperative approach, rather than something confrontational. 
 
Finally the strategy recommends supporting independent media; given the importance the 
state propaganda machine has played in exacerbating tensions over the Ukraine conflict, this 
remains essential and may be worthy of additional attention. In terms of conflict prevention, 
there may be opportunities to use new and independent media channels to expose the Russian 
population to other perspectives on the causes and effects of the Ukraine crisis (not 
necessarily pro-Ukrainian unity/pro-European) and using this as a basis for debate within 
society.   
 
Result area two: Improved environment and reduced climate impact in the 
Baltic Sea Region. 
 
It is unclear as yet to what extent Baltic Sea cooperation has been affected by the general 
decrease in ability and willingness for global collective action/cooperation resulting from the 
Ukraine crisis. There appears to be a level of pragmatism among Nordic actors, which 
suggests that cooperation on environmental issues with Russia can continue from their 
perspective.
40
 Indeed, it is possible that this Result Area will prove to be neutral enough to 
demonstrate how a cooperative approach can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes (as 
opposed to a zero-sum approach) and can thus be used to make inroads into overcoming 
entrenched positions.  
 
If opportunities arise, these should be used to foster cooperation and debate both between 
state institutions and civil society, with a particular emphasis on analysing regional 
interdependence and mutually beneficial solutions. That said, there is a risk that the 
cooperation with Russia on environmental issues is undermined somewhat by Russia’s 
narrative about the cause of conflict being Western interest in its energy reserves. In addition, 
Sida should consider whether civil society support in this area exposes its partners to similar 
risks as described above and provide support to overcome them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/baltic-parliamentary-summit-discusses-ukraine (24/11/2014) 
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Part 3: Suggestions and Conclusions  
 
This section draws some general conclusions, before identifying issues for attention and/or 
review and making suggestions under each results area, corresponding to the needs identified 
in this analysis to (a) respond to new regional risks related to the conflict; (b) ensure conflict-
sensitivity of interventions; and (c) create opportunities for confidence-building and conflict-
prevention. 
 
3.1. Some General Conclusions 
 
Although many of the factors that led to the eruption of violence in Ukraine were part of 
longer term developments in the region and are therefore largely reflected in Sida’s Results 
Strategy, it is important to note that conflict contexts can change rapidly. It is therefore 
welceom that Sida staff are stepping back from daily programming tasks on a regular basis to 
review. It is imporant in this context to analyse the context using a conflict lens to ensure that 
the principles of 1) understanding the context in which the organisation operates; 2) 
understanding the interaction between its intervention and that context; and 3) acting upon 
this understanding in order to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on 
conflict are fully incorporated into its developing portfolio. This analysis should include a 
political-economy review of Russia’s position, as it is also important from a conflict 
sensitivity perspective, to ensure that Sida staff are aware of how the EU and Sida are 
perceived in EaP countries and Russia, with many citizens in Eastern Europe viewing the 
European integration agenda as a key driver of conflict (whether they support that integration 
or not).  
 
In light of the effective penetration and use of Russian government propaganda on the 
conflict and the increasing polarisation of opinions, Sida may wish to make ‘civil society 
debate’ a cross-cutting theme for its portfolio and make use of any opportunity to expose the 
men and women of the EaP and Russian region to a range of diverse opinions and to enable 
them to develop a sense of agency in their situation.  
 
Finally, when developing regional projects across the EaP region, opportunities should be 
considered for including Russia as a means of building trust and contacts across the region; 
possible areas for this include the environment, which is not traditionally perceived as a 
sphere of competition in the region; and local-level income generating projects, which can 
develop business contacts across conflict divides. 
 
3.2. Conclusions relevant to Eastern Partnership Results Strategy 
 
In this sub-section, we highlight a few of the findgins and suggestions emerging in Section 2 
above.  
 
To ensure the conflict sensitivity of interventions in EaP countries, it is suggested that Sida 
conducts a participatory analysis and/or mapping of attitudes towards its key result areas 
among pro-Russian and pro-European constituencies within EaP countries. This information 
should underpin all three results areas, allowing Sida to engage with the full spectrum of 
attitudes, identify areas of common interest between different groups and ensure that public 
debate on costs and benefits of European integration includes a range of voices.  
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Result area one: enhanced economic integration 
 The success of this result area will be contingent on public support across the EaP for 
European integration, depsite the challenges and disruptions of associated reform 
processes. Accordingly, Sida may wish to develop programing increasing awareness and 
understanding of what European economic integration entails; for example through public 
and academic discussion on the costs and benefits of increasing access to the EU market 
and the feasibility of integration with EU and Russian markets. Dialogue work could be 
complemented by income generating projects that demonstrate the tangible benefits of 
economic reform. 
 In order to ensure conflict sensitivity, Sida could usefully review existing initiatives to 
facilitate enterprise and entrepreneurship and supporting SMEs (as well as any new 
projects) to ensure they target all societal groups, including pro-Russian or other 
marginalised groups. 
 Supporting regional business partnerships, if possible including Russia, could provide an 
opportunity for building trust and confidence across borders. 
 
Result area two: strengthened democracy and human rights 
 If the reform process takes off in Ukraine, it might be possible to amplify its effects in the 
region by providing opportunities for civil society and state representatives from the EaP 
region to participate from an early stage to learn lessons and provide impetus for reform 
elsewhere. 
 In order to ensure conflict sensitivity, Sida could usefully review existing (and future) 
civil society partners in relation to the extent to whicht they reflect and represent a range 
of different perspectives. In order to increase effectiveness, Sida should consider 
increasing support to non-traditional civil society groups. This will require careful 
managing and oversight, at least initially, inlcuding some reviews of funding procedures. 
 
 There is an increased need to improve security (policing) and access to justice provision 
for people and communities in the EaP region in light of diminished external security. A 
prioritiy is to support reforms to promote and ensure that police ecome effective service 
provideers,a dmnore specifically are able to effectively ensure people’s right to freedom 
of expression and assembly. After frautrations with previoius efforts to support SSR in 
the 1990s, this area of support deserves renewed focus at present – aiming to idnetifiy 
oppportunities in the present context and learning from past experiences. A potential 
regional entry point may be civil society involvement in security sector reform. 
Increasing the scope of Sida’s involvement in security issues would contribute to 
achieving results under result area two (especially around right to freedom of expression 
and assembly), while also serving as long term conflict-prevention measure. 
 There is a need to maintain, and re-emphasise focus on protracted and ‘frozen’ conflicts. 
This is obviously very hard. Participatory conflict analysis involving diverse civil society 
actors may generate fresh ideas needed for engagement. In addition to building trust 
between conflicting parties in protracted conflicts, there is also need to build trust in 
parties hoping to mediate – EU and Western institutions. Work promoting inclusive and 
tolerant governance in self-declared republics is necessary to prevent further polarisation 
in the EaP region.  
 
Result area three: environment  
 It may be possible to use the relatively non-controversial nature (in terms or geo-politics) 
of this result area to demonstrate the benefits of European values and constructive 
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cooperation of state and civil society, as part of democracy promotion efforts where direct 
democracy promotion may be sensitive.  
 Activities in this result area may also be used for regional cooperation in which Russian 
specialists could be involved, maintaining links and hopefully demonstrating usefulness 
of regional cooperation. 
 Sida-led outreach on why diversification and environmental issues are important for all 
actors may help mitigate the risk that alternative energy sources and environmental issues 
are perceived as hypocritical, given Russian analyses of EU interest in EaP as linked 
solely to hydrocarbon access. 
 
 
3.3. Conclusions relevant to Russia Results Strategy 
 
The Ukraine crisis has increased pressure on CSOs working with Western partners, creating 
additional constraints on their ability to build relations and influence others. We suggest that 
Sida conducts a thorough risk assessment of new challenges and risks for civil society and 
initiatives and develop mitigation strategies to increase the chances of achieving expected 
outcomes.  
 
Results Area One: Increased respect for human rights and the strengthening of 
development of democracy and citizen participation 
 Countering increased hostility to democracy at a societal level is essential for success 
under this results area. Broad societal dialogue on what democracy entails and the 
benefits it can bring may challenge negative portrayals. In addition to Sida’s named 
priorities, it may be beneficial to identify areas perceived as more pragmatic and which 
are likely to bring tangible benefits for society (for example improving rule of law, 
transparency and countering corruption as means of improving the business climate) as a 
focus for dialogue and subsequent reform efforts related to democracy promotion. 
 Existing capacity building support for civil society actors should be reviewed and 
possibly refocused in order to counter the increasingly hostile environment in which they 
are working. Three key areas emerge: firstly, financing of CSOs – in the short term, core-
funding for Russian CSOs is essential; however support to civil society to develop self-
financing mechanisms and identify private donors within Russia is essential to facilitate 
the emergence of a genuinely independent civil society and mitigate the risks they are 
perceived as foreign agents. Secondly, capacity building efforts need to include a focus 
on outreach and grassroots mobilisation, to address the growing scepticism of the Russian 
population of Western-backed NGOs and increase the connections and ‘grounding’ of 
civil society with constituencies other than just pro-Western educated elites. Thirdly, 
diversification of partners to include groups harder to label as foreign agents (for example 
disparate groups of civil society activists, working through virtual networks; academic 
institutions; and professional bodies. 
 Sida may wish to review the types of initiative it supports to reduce risk and increase 
potential for conflict prevention and trust building. This could include supporting 
local/national government involvement in civil society initiatives to mitigate risks of 
projects being perceived as confrontational.  Work with independent media could 
incorporate a conflict-prevention lens, by providing access to different narratives on the 
conflict in Ukraine, and stimulating debate around this. Finally, although a departure from 
the current strategy Sida may wish to consider adding support for local-level income-
generation activities to its portfolio of work in Russia. In addition to building trust in 
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Sida, if linked to discussions on improving the business climate through addressing 
corruption and strengthening the rule of law, this could help demonstrate the link between 
economic prosperity and democracy. It could also be linked to regional economic 
development programmes across Eastern Europe, providing opportunities for regional 
confidence-building. 
 
Results area two: Enhancing the environment and reduced climate impact 
in Baltic Sea Region 
 Utilise any opportunity under this results area to foster cooperation and debate between 
state institutions and civil society, with a particular emphasis on analysing  
interdependence and mutually beneficial solutions between countries in the region. 
 Consider conducting a risk assessment to determine the extent that the Russian narrative 
that Ukraine conflict stems from Western interest in Russian hydrocarbons has 
undermined confidence of project targets and beneficiaries. If risk deemed substantial, 
develop increased outreach and awareness raising activities on the importance of global 
environmental issues and alternative energy sources. 
 
 
Finally, we recognise that our suggestions are wide – ranging, with varying prospects for 
success in the present highly political and conflcitual environment. We hope that they are at 
least sueful stimuli for review and discussion at Sida. 
